KITAHARA Minoru

写真a

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Title

Professor

Laboratory location

Sugimoto Campus

Research Areas 【 display / non-display

microeconomics

Current Career 【 display / non-display

  • Osaka City University   Graduate School of Economics   Contemporary Economy Course   Professor  

 

Published Papers 【 display / non-display

  • Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities

    Yasunori Okumura

    International Journal of Game Theory  50 ( 4 ) 971 - 987 2021.12  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    We provide a school choice model where the student priority orders for schools are allowed not to be total. We introduce a class of algorithms, each of which derives a student optimal stable matching once we have an initial stable matching, when the priorities are represented by partial orders. Since a method to derive a stable matching exists when the priorities are partial orders, we can use it to derive a student optimal stable matching. Moreover, we show that any student optimal stable matchings that Pareto dominate the starting stable one are obtained via an algorithm within this class. For the problem of improving efficiency by allowing some priorities to be violated, the algorithms can also be applied, with a weaker assumption on the violations than in the previous study. Finally, we suggest some specific rules of priorities that can be introduced by weakening the requirement of total ordering.

    DOI

  • On the number of employed in the matching model

    Yasunori Okumura

    Journal of Mathematical Economics  83   63 - 69 2019.08  [Refereed]

     View Summary

    This study analyzes the number of matches in stable and efficient matchings. The benchmark number of matches is the largest one among the matchings in which no agent can be better off by itself. We show that, in the one-to-one matching model, the number of matches in any stable matching is more than or equal to the smallest integer that is not less than half of the benchmark number. This result is satisfied even if “stable matching” is replaced by “efficient matching”. We extend the model to the many-to-one matching one and provide the sets of preference profiles in which each of the above results continues to hold.

    DOI

  • Mixed Duopoly, Product Differentiation, and Competition

    Toshihiro Matsumura

    The Manchester School  2013.09  [Refereed]

  • Measuring a Dynamic Price Index using Consumption Data

    Shuhei Aoki

    Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking  42   959 - 964 2010.08  [Refereed]

    DOI

  • Simultaneous Price Changes, Information Acquisition on Common Competitors, and Welfare

    Toshihiro Matsumura

    Australian Economic Papers  47   389 - 395 2008.12  [Refereed]

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Conference Activities & Talks 【 display / non-display

  • Technology Polarization

    2017 American Economic Association Annual Meeting  2017.01